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Summary.
The approach of causality based on physical laws and systems proposed
by Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit (2009) is revisited. The issue of ”levels”,
the relevance to epidemiology and the definition of effects are particularly de-
veloped. Moreover it is argued that this approach that we call the stochastic
system approach is particularly well fitted to study lifecourse epidemiology.
A hierarchy of factors is described that could be modeled using a suitable
multivariate stochastic process. To illustrate this approach, a conceptual
model for coronary heart disease mixing continuous and discrete state-space
processes is proposed.
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in developing statistical formalisms which
help to draw conclusions about causal influences from statistical analysis
in various fields, and especially in epidemiology. Of course this raises the
philosophical question about the very meaning of the concept of ”cause”,
and here, different approaches have been taken. Thus different statistical
formalisms arise from different philosophical views of causality. For general
texts on causality we refer to Bunge (2008) and Pearl (2000) for philosophi-
cal and statistical points of view respectively. In contemporary debates three
concepts have been proposed for grounding the concept of causality: inter-
vention, counterfactuals and physical laws. Specific statistical methods have
been developed on the basis of these concepts.
Intervention is an important concept because it may serve for defining
causality. Intervention is the ultimate goal in many fields, and in particular
in epidemiology. Randomized designs are considered as the best proof of a
causal influence. Defining causality on the basis of this concept however is not
completely satisfactory. Moreover, randomized studies (and more generally
experiments) are not sufficient and have limitations. The most obvious one
is that sometimes experimentation is impossible or cannot be used to explore
all aspects of the problem (Rosenblum et al., 2009).
The counterfactual approach is an attempt to define causality. The con-
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cept has been defended by Lewis (1973) on the philosophical ground and first
applied in statistical experiments by Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1978); then
it has been developed and applied in numerous papers in both experiments
and observational epidemiology; for instance Robins et al. (2000) used this
framework to develop the marginal structural models. Counterfactuals have
been implemented in statistical models through the formalism of potential
outcomes. This is nowadays the dominant approach in statistics. However
defining causality through counterfactuals has raised many criticisms from a
philosophical point of view (Menzies, 2009) and some in the statistical lit-
erature (Dawid, 2000; Geneletti and Dawid, 2010). Moreover the potential
outcome formalism seems difficult to apply in complex dynamical models.
The concept of physical laws, or laws of nature, may be used to ground
causality from a philosophical point of view. The basic physical laws tell
something about change in time, while time ordering is part of the definition
of causality on which everybody agrees: causes precede effects. An interesting
starting point is a famous text written by Laplace at the beginning of the
XIXth century, which states that by knowing the laws of nature the future
state of the universe could be predicted if the present state was known.
Even if this program is somewhat too ambitious, it has been the aim of
science to decipher the laws of nature, and prediction ability has been both
a way for testing theories and and their main utility. More recently the
concept of mechanism has been discussed by Wimsatt (2007) and Bechtel
and Abrahamsen (2005). In the statistical field this point of view has been
translated in terms of dynamical models by Granger (1969) using a time-
series framework; Eichler and Didelez (2010) have developed general formula
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for computing marginal effects of interventions in time series framework. The
approach has been generalized to continuous-time processes by Aalen (1987),
Didelez (2008) and Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit (2009).
The aim of the paper is to focus the approach of Commenges and Ge´gout-
Petit (2009) on the philosophical aspects and on the relevance in epidemiol-
ogy, and especially lifecourse epidemiology, a field which attracts more and
more interest (Kuh, 2003). It raises special challenges for causal interpreta-
tion, and implementation of the stochastic system approach appears to be
well adapted to ”understand trajectories”, a main aim of lifecourse epidemi-
ology (Ben-Shlomo, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a philosophi-
cal account of the approach of causality as it can be grounded on physical
laws applied to systems. In section 3 we present the general mathemati-
cal framework within which the application of physical laws to systems can
be formalized: this is a general multivariate stochastic process, presented
in Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit (2009). Influences between components of
the process can be defined through the Doob-Meyer decomposition and can
be represented by a directed graph. The issue of quantifying an influence,
that is the definition of effects is discussed. In section 4 we consider how
this approach could be applied to lifecourse epidemiology, a topic of growing
interest. We propose a classification of factors going from lifestyle factors
to disease, and we develop a conceptual model for coronary heart disease.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 Causality
2.1 Physical laws, systems, levels
Pierre-Simon Laplace wrote at the beginning of his Essai philosophique sur
les probabilite´s (Laplace, 1986): ”Nous devons donc envisager l’e´tat pre´sent
de l’univers, comme l’effet de son e´tat ante´rieur, et comme la cause de celui
qui va suivre. Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donne´, connaˆıtrait toutes
les forces dont la nature est anime´e, et la situation respective des eˆtres qui
la composent, si d’ailleurs elle e´tait assez vaste pour soumettre ces donne´es a`
l’analyse, embrasserait dans la meˆme formule les mouvements des plus grands
corps de l’univers et ceux du plus le´ger atome : rien ne serait incertain pour
elle, et l’avenir comme le passe´ serait pre´sent a` ses yeux. L’esprit humain
offre, dans la perspective qu’il a su donner a` l’astronomie, une faible esquisse
de cette intelligence.” In other (and english) words, if we knew the laws of
nature (physical laws) and the state of the entities on which they apply at a
given time, we could predict the future state of the universe. It is of course
impossible to achieve such a program. The first obstacle is that we do not
know all the physical laws and it is impossible to know the exact state of the
universe at a given time. This was explicitly acknowledged by Laplace and
was the reason why he went on developing an essay on probabilities just after
formulating this plea for determinism ! Moreover quantum theory shows that
randomness is an intrinsic feature of our universe and chaos theory shows how
deterministic phenomena produce randomness.
Another obstacle, less explicitly stated by Laplace, is that it is of course
impossible to model the whole universe, not only because the precision of
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observation is limited but because we need manageable models. Only some
very limited sets of events of the universe can be considered at a time. In
the last sentence of the quoted text, Laplace takes as an illustration what
has been achieved in predicting the movements of planets and comets using
the recently developed theory of mass attraction. Such an analysis uses only
Newton’s laws applied to the movement of some celestial bodies identified
only by their masses, and their locations and speeds at a given time. The
fact that such an analysis is efficient shows that there is a property of ”sepa-
rability” of the universe. For instance, all the events relative to the presence
of life on earth have no influence on the movement of earth; neither has the
explosion of a star in a far-away galaxy. The development of a tumor in a
human being is not affected by the movement of earth (conditionally on the
fact that earth exists) and Newton laws are not very helpful to explain this
phenomenon. This leads us to the concept of levels and of systems. Any
scientific work begins by defining events of interest. These events are related
to the evolution of entities (material or not). Physical laws allow predicting
these events either exactly or, more generally, giving a probability law for
these events. The set of events and entities considered is called a system.
An important concept, well known in the engineering literature (Sage and
Melsa, 1971), is that of ”input”, which makes the concept of system more
flexible in that it is not completely isolated from the rest of the universe.
Inputs can also serve for controlling the system.
A system belongs to a certain level. Levels are indexed by scale and com-
plexity. Scale is the dimension in space and time of the considered entities.
For instance in astronomy we may consider the movement of planets of the
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solar systems during some centuries. Human beings do not belong to the
spatial scale of this system. There is also a hierarchy of complexity. Ele-
mentary particles are structured in atoms, atoms in molecules, molecules in
living cells, cells in organisms, organisms in societies. The scale and complex-
ity dimensions interact in that considering a large scale is also considering a
large number of units of a certain level. For instance considering a piece of
metal of 10cm is considering a very marge number of atoms. Considering a
region of space of one billion of cube-kilometers is considering such a large
number of atoms that they can structure in stars and planets. Generally, to
different levels, different physical laws apply. In physics, gravitation applies
in principle at all scales but is negligible at the nanometer scale while it is the
main force at the level of a planetary system. If we look at the complexity
dimension, the gravitation law for instance is not very helpful for explaining
the functioning of a living cell. The laws at a given level can in part be
explained by the laws at a lower level. This reductionism principle is very
useful, but at the same time there is the emergence of new laws at each level.
This can be summarized by saying that ”the whole is more than the sum
of its parts” (Anderson, 1972; Wimsatt, 1994). We can distinguish systems
made of a small number of entities (atoms, molecules, planetary systems)
and those made of a large number of entities either homogeneous (crystal,
piece of metal, gas, population of bacteria) or heterogenous (planet, cell, or-
ganism, society). In the first case we have a population of entities, in the
second case we have a new entity at a different level. These dimensions of
levels are illustrated in Figure 1 where some levels of different complexity
and scales are shown.
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Figure 1: Some levels. Vertical dimension: complexity: molecules, cells
organisms are at different complexity levels. Horizontal dimension: scale:
different levels arise if we consider large numbers of molecules, cells or organ-
isms.
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2.2 Epidemiology as a science
2.3 Levels of Epidemiology
In epidemiology we most often work at the level of a subject. Thus the sys-
tems are sets of events that can happen to a subject. As in the solar system
example, we shall not consider all the events that are related to a subject, but
rather selected sets of events that we consider as possibly connected, while
being only weakly connected to any other event. For instance we may be
interested in smoking and lung cancer. Note that we consider both smoking
and lung cancer as ”state” processes, and thus they will be represented by
stochastic processes. On the contrary, gender, date of birth and genetic char-
acteristics are attributes, that is not varying in time and contributing to the
identification of that particular subject. As another example, we may con-
sider HIV viral load, CD4+ T lymphocytes concentration and opportunistic
diseases as components of the state, keeping gender, date of birth and genetic
characteristics as attributes. While these factors are clearly attributes, this is
less clear for other factors such as educational level, occupation, size. These
factors could be considered as attributes in most studies because they are
fairly constant on long time periods; they are however the result of processes
which occurred during youth. Age is neither a process nor an attribute, but
most often this is the time parameter in the processes associated to a subject.
While the central level of epidemiology is made of particular events hap-
pening to subjects (in general human beings) two other levels can be con-
sidered: population of subjects (an upper level) and population of cells (a
lower level). An epidemics is an event which happens at the population level.
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In pharmaco-epidemiology we may also be interested in the distribution of
parameters in the population. Incidence and prevalence of a disease are
components of the ”state” of a population. On the other hand, events occur-
ring to populations of cells have an impact on clinical events at the subject
level. For instance the interaction between populations of HIV viruses and
CD4+ lymphocytes have an impact on AIDS. This level is at the margin of
epidemiology and system biology.
2.4 Laws in epidemiology
There is a huge gap between physics and epidemiology, with biology some-
what in-between. It may be questioned whether our approach of causality
based on physical laws and inspired by physics is relevant here. At a complex
level we will speak rather of mechanisms than of physical laws (these mech-
anisms being based on physical laws at a lower level). In epidemiology, in
contrast with physics, very little is known about ”physical laws”. It may be
questioned whether there are ”physical laws” at the level of a human subject.
Such laws could be called ”clinical laws”, reserving the term ”epidemiolog-
ical laws” to laws applying to populations of subjects. Such laws are more
imprecise than in physics, they are most often probabilistic and they are not
known with precision. Yet it is established that smoking increases the risk
of lung cancer, and relatively precise studies have been done to describe the
relationship between the two processes; for instance, Breslow et al. (1987).
In contrast there does not seem to be direct biological mechanisms which
link alcohol drinking to lung cancer (although an indirect influence is not ex-
cluded). A graphical representation of causal influences for the factors “Lung
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cancer”, “Drinking”, “Smoking” could be constructed, adding a psychologi-
cal predisposition to addictions that could be considered as an attribute as
well as genetic factors (which are clearly attributes); see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Causal influences for Lung cancer. Filled circles represent states,
while filled squares represent attributes.
Similarly, HIV infection has an influence on AIDS; the latency distri-
bution between infection and AIDS has been estimated in several studies.
These are clinical facts which derive from biological mechanisms. At the
epidemiological level, such influences may be considered as direct, although
at the biological level one may find intermediary factors. Concentrations of
CD4+ T cells, of HIV viruses and of bacteria associated to an opportunistic
disease are intermediary factors at the level of population of cells. These
clinical facts can be used to study the effect of an epidemics in a population,
for instance the relationship between incidence of infection and incidence of
AIDS by backcalculation methods Brookmeyer (1991), or to predict the im-
pact of an anti-smoking campaign on cancer incidence. HIV infected patients
treated with antiretroviral treatment have a much lower risk of developing
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AIDS than untreated patients, opportunistic diseases may be prevented by
prophylactic treatments. This is not really a law but a clinical fact that relies
on biological mechanisms related to the properties of the treatment on the
replication of the HIV virus and of the immune system. This fact lies on bio-
logical mechanisms, themselves lying on properties of molecules, themselves
lying on basic physical laws.
2.5 Learning laws in epidemiology
At the beginning of any science both physical laws and relevant systems are
unknown. The first step is the identification of entities. Then a precise de-
scription of events. Then a law is proposed and applied to a simple system.
Then more complex systems are considered. The archetype of this process is
astronomy of the solar system: identification of planets; description of their
movement; Newton’s laws; application to simple systems made of the Sun
and one planet; more complex systems with several planets. In epidemiology
we are often in the situation of the beginning of a science where both laws
and relevant systems are unknown. Medical doctors and epidemiologists how-
ever identify diseases, physiological conditions, behaviors and make progress
in describing their evolutions. Approximate laws can sometimes be found
which have a biological grounding. On the basis of these causal discoveries,
interventions can be developed. Three big successes in which epidemiology
has played an important role are the decrease of mortality from lung cancer,
cardiovascular diseases and AIDS in most developed countries by intervening
on both the main risk behaviors and the main biological factors. Note that
intervening on behaviors implies considering an upper level of complexity
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that is psychology and sociology.
One obvious difficulty in epidemiology comes from the complexity of the
biological processes leading to diseases. Another one is the sparsity of obser-
vations of these processes. Here the situation is improving as more and more
cohort studies are launched with more and more repeated observations of bi-
ological markers (including imaging). One favorable feature in epidemiology
is the availability of a large number of replica of similar systems (the events
occurring in subjects of a large sample). Dynamical models are necessary to
grasp the dynamics of the biological and clinical phenomena. Cox model was
the first widely used approach attempting to grasp this dynamics. Systems
are generally multivariate so that multistate models or joint models are more
adapted to approach causality.
3 Mathematical representations of laws and
systems and definition of effects
3.1 Definition of influences
Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit (2009) in line with Aalen (1987) and Didelez
(2008) have developed a mathematical framework for representing causal
influences. They defined a class of stochastic processes called D which en-
compasses processes with continuous and discrete state-spaces. For a given
problem one defines a couple (A,X), where A is multivariate random variable
representing the attributes of the system and X is a multivariate stochastic
process representing the state of the system. They further defined the WCLI
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property from a measurability condition of the compensator (or the intensity)
of the process. Grossly speaking, a component Xk is WCLI from a compo-
nent Xj if Xj does not appear in the intensity of Xk. Influence is defined as a
lack of the WCLI property. Consider for instance a two-dimensional stochas-
tic process X = (X1, X2) where X2 admits the Doob-Meyer decomposition
dX2t = λ2(X¯1t−, X¯2t−)dt+dM2t, where X¯1t−, X¯2t− represent respectively the
histories of X1 and X2 up to time t. If λ2(X¯1t−, X¯2t−) does not depend on
X¯1t− (which can be given a rigorous definition in terms of measurability)
then X2 is WCLI from X1. If λ2(X¯1t−, X¯2t−) does depend on X¯1t−, we shall
say that X1 directly influences X2; we note X1 −→X X2. The definition of
influence can be extended to influence of attributes on states.
Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit (2009) also link the concepts of system,
physical laws and causality; this is because the Doob-Meyer decomposition
depends on both filtration and probability law. Essentially they assume that
there exist a rich enough system SM in which influences between components
of interests coincide with influences that could be computed using physical
laws. In such a system influences are causal influences.
WCLI can be defined on a random horizon (0, T ) suggested by Didelez
(2008) and Rø ysland (2011). The extension to random horizon and intervals
is useful in particular in applications to epidemiology. Assume that Xk is a
counting process representing the occurrence of a disease, lung cancer for
instance. Let T be the time of occurrence of lung cancer. We are interested
in the influence of a risk factor, say smoking habits, on lung cancer. In our
formalism lung cancer is represented by a counting process, and we wish to
know whether the lung cancer process is WCLI from the risk factor process
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up to T . The influence of Lung cancer on the risk factor is another (generally
less relevant) problem.
3.2 Definition of conditional direct effects
Most epidemiological studies aim at assessing whether a factor F has a causal
influence on a disease D; if it does, it is important to quantify this influence.
Here, we wish to go beyond the binary concept of causal influence: what we
call “effect” is a degree of causal influence.
We shall consider a simple situation, where we assume that there is a per-
fect system (for each subject in a population) that we call SM , represented
by three processes F,D and G. We assume that F causally influences D; G
causally influence both F and D; there is no other causal influence on D. For
simplicity we assume that there is no attribute. The graph of causal influ-
ences represented in Figure 3 looks familiar, illustrating a confounding factor
G, but there are some important differences with conventional graphs: (i) all
the vertices represents processes; (ii) these could be multivariate processes;
(iii) we assume that this is a “perfect system”, in that the dynamics of the
processes could in principle be computed from the knowledge of underlying
biological mechanisms. The theory also allows reverse influence (the graph
is not necessarily acyclic).
The dynamics of D can be analyzed using the Doob-Meyer decomposition
(in the filtration FM generated by the process and under the true law P ∗),
which, assuming intensities exists, can be written as a system of stochastic
differential equations (SDE):
15
Figure 3: ”Perfect” observation system SM .
dDt = λDt(F¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)dt+ dMD,t (1)
dGt = λGt(G¯t−)dt+ dMG,t (2)
dFt = λFt(F¯t−, G¯t−)dt+ dMF,t
It is natural to measure the direct conditional effect of F as the contrast
between the values of the intensity of D for two different values that F could
take; these values are in fact trajectories up to time t−, say f¯t− and f¯ ′t−. We
denote the instantaneous (causal) effect (or contrast) at time t, conditional
on G as:
IEfGF→D(f¯t−, f¯
′
t−, t, D¯t−) = φ(λDt(f¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−), λDt(f¯
′
t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)). (3)
A cumulative effect can be defined in the of the cumulative intensities (or
compensators) as :
CEfGF→D(f¯t−, f¯
′
t−, t, D¯t−) = φ(ΛDt(f¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−),ΛDt(f¯
′
t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)), (4)
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where φ(x, y) may be called a contrast function.
It is natural to take the contrast on either a multiplicative or an addi-
tive scale. Consider the case where F and G are univariate and not time-
dependent, and D is a disease represented by a counting process. If the
intensity λDt has the multiplicative form λDt = 1{Dt−=0}α0(t)e
β1F+β2G, then
the instantaneous effect is eβ1(f−f
′), that is equal to the relative risk for a
unit change of the value of F . In that particular case the instantaneous ef-
fect does not depend on time nor on the particular value of G; the cumulative
effect takes the same value. On the other hand an additive contrast would
fit better if the intensity itself has the additive form:
λDt = 1{Dt−=0}[α0(t) + β1F + β2G]. (5)
Then the instantaneous effect would be β1(f − f ′); the cumulative effect is
β1(f−f ′)t. In the additive model we have the equality: CEfGF→D(ft−, f ′t−, t) =∫ t
0 IEf
G
F→D(fu−, f
′
u−, u)du.
Remark. [Effect depending on D] The effect as defined depends on
the value of D itself. Note that if D is a 0-1 counting process, we can
avoid mentioning the history of D, because up to the jump-time nothing
happens. If D has several jumps (representing recurrent events), for instance
D takes values 0, 1, 2, the effect of F at time t for Dt = 0 and for Dt = 1
may be different. This is not so surprising if we think that this system
can be represented by a three-state irreversible process, and the effects of
explanatory variables can be estimated for the two transitions 0 → 1 and
1→ 2.
In a general dynamical setting, there are advantages to assess the effects
on an additive scale. Relative risks make sense if the intensities are positive;
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they make less sense if the “intensities” can be null or negative, which may
happen in diffusion processes. Also, linearity of the contrast leads to simpler
links between instantaneous and cumulative effects, and between conditional
and mean effects.
Another issue is the definition of indirect effect. There is no space in this
paper to develop this issue but there is an example in section 4.2.2.
3.3 Intervention systems
In the previous section F,G,D are generic names so that the system is
abstract; in an application, we have a population of systems S iM corre-
sponding to a population of subjects i = 1, . . . , N . The stochastic processes
(F i, Gi, Di) and (F i
′
, Gi
′
, Di
′
) are different processes, although they have the
same clinical or biological meaning. For instance Di may represent lung can-
cer for subject i; it is not the same event if subject i (say John) or subject
i′ (say Paul) develops a lung cancer at time t. In some cases it is possible to
construct systems in which F can be manipulated, for instance for subjects in
a clinical trial. The system for a subject i′ in a clinical trial will be specified
by (F i
′
, Gi
′
, Di
′
) with the same biological or clinical meaning as in an obser-
vation study; it will in addition contain a control entry U i
′
. This is also a
perfect system for this subject but the true law governing (F i
′
, Gi
′
, Di
′
, U i
′
)
is different from that of (F i, Gi, Di). Since the way D is influenced by F
derives from biological mechanisms, it is the same in both systems; the same
is true for the influence of G on D. However the presence of U i
′
makes the
dynamics of F different for i and i′. If F i
′
is completely manipulated by U i
′
there can be no influence of Gi
′
on F i
′
.
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Remark. [Feasibility of intervention] One may ask how it is possible
to construct systems in which Gi−→/ SiM F i leaving all the other influences
unchanged. First it is not always possible to construct such systems. This
is sometimes possible, and the reason why factor F is of particular interest
may be that F can be easily manipulated. We may consider that in such
cases the influence of G on F is “fragile” and can be broken; this is the case
if F is a treatment.
Mathematically we could say that an observational system S iM and an
interventional system SIi′M are the same but with a different law. These
laws are the restriction of the true probability law P ∗ to the filtrations of the
systems S iM and SIi′M , that we will call P ∗O and P ∗I respectively, omitting
the subscripts i and i′ in the iid case. However we must not forget that these
systems are different as they correspond to different subjects. A generic sys-
tem, where the stochastic processes do not represent real events, but just
retains the structure of possible real systems will be called an abstract sys-
tem. In the following we shall continue with abstract systems for notational
simplicity. We can now study the relationship between an abstract obser-
vation system (Figure 3) and a corresponding abstract intervention system
(Figure 4). One goes from the first to the second by breaking the influence
of G on F while keeping the other influences unchanged, an operation that
Pearl (2000) represents by the “Do” operator. It is clear that the conditional
effect of F on D is the same in both models because λDt(F¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−) is
the same.
19
Figure 4: ”Perfect” intervention system SIi′M .
3.4 Computation of marginal causal effect in interven-
tion and observation systems
3.4.1 General
An important issue is to be able to compute the mean effect of an inter-
vention (the marginal causal effect). By the innovation theorem, the in-
tensity of D in the simpler intervention system SI2 where G is ignored, is:
EP ∗I [λDt(F¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)|F¯t−, D¯t−]. This is interesting because we may not al-
ways observe G and we may wish to have a summary of the effect of F not
depending on G. This is often not very easy to compute mathematically but
this will be directly observed in the intervention system SI2.
20
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Figure 5: Imperfect intervention system SI2
In contrast the marginal causal effect cannot in general be obtained if we
know only the law of the simpler observational system S2 which does not
contain G (intuitively, this means that we cannot estimate the effect of F if
we don’t take confounders into account). In such a system, by the innovation
theorem, the compensator of D in the filtration (F2) generated by F and D
is λF
2
Dt(F¯t−) = EP ∗O [λDt(F¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)|F2t−]. This expectation is not equal in
general to EP ∗I [λDt(F¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)|F2t−].
If we observe the perfect observation system it is possible to retrieve the
marginal causal effect. This is because if we know P ∗O on SM we also know
P ∗I (see section 3.4.2). In practice if G and D are complex processes this may
not be so easy. It would still be possible to compute any relevant effect by
simulation. Indeed the system SM is characterized under P ∗I where F¯ = f¯
by the Doob-Meyer decomposition:
dDt = λDt(f¯t−, G¯t−, D¯t−)dt+ dMD,t
dGt = λGt(G¯t−, )dt+ dMG,t.
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These equations are the same as the first two equations (1),(2) for P ∗O.
Realizations of this system of SDE can be generated by simulation: if both
G and D are counting processes this is not difficult, if they are diffusion
processes this can be done using techniques described in Kloeden et al. (1994);
these techniques must be adapted if there is a mix of counting and diffusion
processes. Realizations of D allow to estimate its marginal law.
3.4.2 A simple example
Let us consider the case where D is a disease represented by a counting
process. If the processes F and G are time-constant they can be summarized
by random variables. It is then equivalent to specify the law of D by the
intensity of the process or by the survival distribution S(t|f) = P (Dt =
0|F = f), and we have: S(t|f) = P (G = 1|F = f)S(t|f,G = 1) + P (G =
0|F = f)S(t|f,G = 0). In the intervention system, that is under the law P ∗I ,
G and F are marginally independent. Thus we have P ∗I (G = 1|F = f) =
P ∗I (G = 1). It follows that
SI(t|f) = P (G = 1)S(t|f,G = 1) + P (G = 0)S(t|f,G = 0) (6)
This is what is observed (using a large sample) in the imperfect intervention
system represented in Figure 5. S(t|f,G = 1) and S(t|f,G = 0) (the survival
conditional on both F and G) as well as P (G = 1) and P (G = 1) (the
marginal distribution of G) are the same in the observation and intervention
systems. Thus if we know the dynamics of the perfect observation system
we can compute the marginal causal effect given by formula (6). Note that
we can also compute the marginal intensity of D; here G has the role of
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a random effect and this problem has been studied by Aalen et al. (2008)
(section 6.2).
In contrast when we use the imperfect observation system depicted in
Figure ?? what we observe is
SO(t|f) = P (G = 1|F = f)S(t|f,G = 1) + P (G = 0|F = f)S(t|f,G = 0),
and we cannot reconstitute SI(t|f) because we observe neither P (G = 1) nor
S(t|f,G = g) for g = 0, 1.
As an applied example in epidemiology, F could represent “Drinking”
and G “Smoking”: the link between smoking and drinking could produce a
spurious influence of drinking on lung cancer if we do not adjust on smoking.
4 Conceptual models for lifecourse epidemi-
ology
4.1 The stochastic system approach to lifecourse epi-
demiology
The stochastic system approach could be applied to lifecourse epidemiology.
In practice this entails defining processes which represent how physiological
processes evolve during life. The main difficulty is to define a relatively small
number of processes that are sufficiently meaningful to make a good system.
Another major difficulty arises when we consider the whole life from birth
(or even from conception): some features evolve fast during childhood but
stabilize during adulthood. The most obvious one is height, which can be
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considered as an attribute for adults (this is given on identity cards) but
would be considered as part of the state for a child. So, we will restrict
here to adult life epidemiology. It is useful to distinguish five categories of
processes:
1. lifestyle factors: diet, physical activity, drinking, smoking, sexual
behavior,...,
2. physiological conditions (or ”embodied” processes): body mass,
lipid profile, blood pressure, inflammation level, oxidative stress, HIV
infection,...,
3. pathological processes: atheromatous process, pre-cancerous cells,
neuronal degeneration, loss of CD4+ T-lymphocytes,...,
4. diseases: coronary heart disease, cancers, Alzheimer disease, AIDS,...,
5. death.
In order to construct a model one has first to choose indicators of these
broadly defined processes, especially for physiological conditions; for instance
body mass can be represented by body mass index (BMI), lipid profile by
LDL cholesterol concentration, high blood pressure by systolic blood pressure
(SBP), and so on. Pathological processes are often difficult to observe and
may be represented by latent processes. Diseases are generally well classified
and observed. Death is of course the simplest process to define and observe.
As for the lifestyle factors, one must also define indicators and it is often
difficult to observe them accurately. Generally as we progress in the list,
the conditions are less and less reversible, and death is not reversible at
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all. On the other hand lifestyle factors are themselves influenced by psycho-
sociological factors. In order to avoid the system to grow indefinitely we
may consider lifestyle factors as input to the system. Finally genetic factors,
which are attributes of the subjects, may influence all the processes, although
with a more modest impact than is generally thought.
4.2 A conceptual model for adult life epidemiology of
coronary heart disease
4.2.1 The model for coronary heart disease
We focus the above approach to coronary heart disease (CHD). Atheroscle-
rosis is the main mechanism of CHD (Nicholls et al., 2006) and the main
risk factors of CHD are known: Berliner et al. (1995); Castelli (1996); Rid-
ker et al. (1998); Kannel et al. (2002); Emberson (2003); Van Gaal et al.
(2006). Beyond a mere enumeration of risk factors our approach consists in
constructing a causal pathway between processes. The ”lifestyle” factors are
diet, physical activity, smoking; the physiological conditions are obesity, lipid
profile, oxydative stress, inflammatory processes; the pathological process is
the atheromatous process and the disease is CHD, which includes myocar-
dial infarction and may lead to death. On this physiological basis we may
attempt to construct a model, as simple as possible, but reflecting the dy-
namics of these processes and the pathways leading from lifestyle to disease.
A possible conceptual model is shown in Figure 6.
To go further we have to represent the categories like ”obesity”, ”blood
pressure”, and so on, by quantitative indicators, and the set of values taken
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Figure 6: Causal pathway for smoking and CHD: Phy: Physical activity;
HBP: high blood pressure; Lip: lipids profile (cholesterol, low and high den-
sity,...); I/Ox: process representing a complex of inflammatory process and
oxidative stress; Ath: atheromatous process.
by them will form a stochastic process. Choosing binary indicators would
lead to a multistate model with many states, that can also be represented
by a multivariate counting process such as proposed by Commenges and
Ge´gout-Petit (2007). For instance a good indicator for obesity is the BMI;
it is possible to define obesity as BMI ≥ 30. Similarly hypercholesterolemia,
hypertension and so on can be defined by dichotomization. This however
entails a loss of information. Most of the processes are better represented
as having a continuous state space. In order to obtain manageable systems
of equations we assume that, possibly after suitable transformations, condi-
tionally on the lifestyle factors, the physiological processes may be modeled
by processes which have the same structure as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU)
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processes; see Kallenberg (2002) for theory and Zhu et al. (2011) for recent
use in biostatistics. For instance we assume that (maybe after transforma-
tion) the LDL process can be described by the following stochastic differential
equation:
dLDLt = θLDL(LDLt − µLDL,t)dt+ dBLDL,t, (7)
where BLDL,t is a Brownian motion. µLDL,t is modelled as a function of indica-
tors of the lifestyle factors ”total energy intake” for Diet (Dt), ”total energy
expenditure” for Physical activity (φt), ”number of cigarettes per day” for
smoking (St) which are considered as input functions. The simplest model
for µLDL,t is the linear model:
µLDL,t = µ0,LDL + βS,LDLSt + βφ,LDLφt + βD,LDLDt.
Note that if the lifestyle factors change in time, µLDL,t is a moving target; if
they are constant, LDL is an ordinary OU process and gets close to a station-
ary process. For indicators of obesity, high blood pressure and inflammation
BMIt, SBPt,CRPt similar modeling can be proposed. A diffusion process
with a positive intensity is adapted to reflect the accumulative character of
the atheromatous process.
dAt = λAtdt+ dBAt, (8)
where the intensity can be modeled as a linear function of the physiological
conditions:
λAt = λ0 + βBMIBMIt + βLDLLDLt + βCRPCRPt + βSBPSBPt. (9)
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Finally CHD can be modeled as an event which occurs when the athero-
matous process crosses a certain threshold: CHDt = 1{At>η}. Thus, for CHD
we assume a degradation model as used by Whitmore (1986) and Aalen et al.
(2008) among others.
4.2.2 Defining effects
Putting aside the inference issue, that is pretending that there are values
of β and η which determine the true probability under which the events
are produced and that there are known, the question that is addressed is
how to quantify the effect of a lifestyle process, for instance ”smoking” on
the atheromatous process and on myocardial infarction. This is an indirect
effect, mediated by the physiological conditions. The first step is to express
the process of interest, for instance At as a function of the lifestyle processes.
For constant lifestyle processes this can be done analytically because the
solution of the differential equation (7) is an OU process. For instance the
LDL process is:
LDLt = LDL0e
θLDLt + µLDL,t(1− e−θLDLt) +
∫ t
0
eθLDL(s−t)dBLDL,s. (10)
Taking into account the linear model of µLDL,t and assuming the initial values
of the embodied processes are equal to zero, the intensity of the atheromatous
process can be written:
λAt = λ0 + [β
t
BMIβS,BMI + β
t
LDLβS,LDL + β
t
CRPβS,CRP + β
t
SBPβS,SBP]St
+ [βtBMIβφ,BMI + β
t
LDLβφ,LDL + β
t
CRPβφ,CRP + β
t
SBPβφ,SBP]φt
+ [βtBMIβD,BMI + β
t
LDLβD,LDL + β
t
CRPβD,CRP + β
t
SBPβD,SBP]Dt +Mt,
28
where Mt is a martingale coming from the last term of equation (10) and
other similar equations, βtLDL = βLDL(1 − e−θLDLt) and similar definitions for
βtLDL, β
t
CRP, β
t
SBP. Up to a term of zero expectation, a linear instantaneous
contrast between two trajectories of the function S, s and s′ for the total
effect on the atheromatous process gives:
λAt(s)− λAt(s′) = [βtBMIβS,BMI + βtLDLβS,LDL + βtCRPβS,CRP + βtSBPβS,SBP](st− s′t).
(11)
Such a simple formula however is not available for summarizing the effect of
smoking on CHD. Customized contrasts can be computed, for instance by
computing P (CHDt = 1|Do St = st).
4.2.3 Possible implementation
If the lifestyle processes are controlled, the atheromatous process is a Gaus-
sian process. The distribution of the time for hitting the barrier η could be
computed numerically by simulation. Thus the computation of the likelihood
for such a model is challenging. There is also the problem of finding enough
information for estimating the parameters. It is likely that one cannot find
a single study giving enough information to identify the model and that we
have to resort n some kind of synthesis analysis (Presanis et al., 2011).
With the assumption that the lifestyle processes are constant, that the
equilibrium is reached rapidly and neglecting the variability, the physiological
processes become constant and the atheromatous process is a Brownian pro-
cess with linear drift with slope λ = λAt. In that case the distribution of the
hitting time is an Inverse Gaussian distribution. Its p.d.f. is η√
2pit3
e−
(η−λt)2
2t ,
so that all the probabilities of all the events pertaining to CHD can be rather
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easily computed. There is however no simple form for a contrast between
different values of a lifestyle process. For given values of the parameters
and values of the lifestyle processes the hazard and the survival functions
can be computed and visualized. Such a model has been fitted to the data
of the literature by Commenges and Hejblum (2012). They used a synthe-
sis approach to fit heterogenous results of several studies by maximizing a
pseudo-likelihood. They obtained reasonably good fit and consistent values
of regression coefficients.
5 Conclusion
We have given an account of a philosophical approach to causality based
on physical laws and systems and we have recalled the main mathematical
tools used for representing causal relationships and proposed some ways of
computing effects. We have examined how this could be applied to epidemi-
ology, and particularly to lifecourse epidemiology. In practice this leads to
develop dynamical models based on stochastic processes, incorporating as
much science as possible. There are two obstacles for implementing complex
dynamical models for lifecourse epidemiology. In complex models the distri-
bution of the observable cannot be obtained analytically and thus they must
be approximated by simulations. This seems however feasible, especially
with the development of parallel computing. The other main obstacle is to
gather sufficient information to estimate the parameters for all the stages of
the model. There are however more and more large or very large cohorts
with a long follow-up. Moreover the synthesis approach used by Commenges
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and Hejblum (2012), see also Presanis et al. (2011), is a promising way for
identifying the models by finding information about diverse parameters in a
large number of studies.
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